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Abstract 
 
The characterisation of truth-preserving arguments, notably conceived as the tool to convince 
interlocutors in a debate, was a core issue in the Indian paradigm of philosophy and received 
the detailed attention of scholars from different philosophical traditions. This paper presents a 
Jaina theory of inference of the 11th century, stressing its divergence with other traditions, 
especially Buddhism. This is first aiming at a presentation of the minimal set of statements 
considered as necessary to bring adhesion. Second, this paper presents the Jaina solution to 
the question of the establishment of the correctness of truth-preserving arguments, first by 
means of a non-inferential source of knowing, second by means of considerations on the 
structure of the inferential reasoning itself. 
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Introduction 
Inferential reasoning is the tool to acquire new knowledge through reasoning and the stated 
form of such an inferential reasoning is a truth-preserving argument by means of which it is 
also possible to bring awareness to somebody else. The determination of truth-preserving 
arguments, notably conceived as the tool to convince interlocutors in a debate, was a core 
issue in the Indian paradigm of philosophy and received the detailed attention of scholars 
from especially three philosophical traditions, namely the Naiyāyika, the Buddhist and the 
Jaina. 
First of all, inference is the means to acquire new knowledge through the careful examination 
of what can be concluded with certainty from previously acquired knowledge. A classic 
example is to infer that something is not permanent from the already-known fact that it is a 
product. Because by definition, every product has been made, therefore it has parts that have 
been arranged, and that philosophers from the different schools agree on the fact that an 
arrangement cannot be permanent. 
Second, a nice peculiarity of the Indian framework of philosophy in the classical period is that 
the different traditions agreed on the possibility to define the standards of an ideally organized 
rational discussion the outcomes of which are necessary true statements. From this, the 
philosophers of all traditions offered decision procedures on the correctness (respectively 
incorrectness) of truth-preserving arguments and they succeed in developing a common inter-
doctrinal framework of argumentation. 
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This paper is concerned with the Jaina contribution on these issues, especially as it is found in 
the work of Prabhācandra, a Digambara scholar active in the turn of the 10th century (980-
1065) who wrote the Sun [that opens] the Lotuses of the Knowable 
(prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, henceforth PKM). The PKM is a commentary on the Introduction 
to Philosophical Investigation (parīkṣāmukham, PM), a treatise composed by Māṇikyanandin 
(9th c.). In turn, the PM is a methodical and aphoristic presentation of Akalaṅka’s philosophy 
(720-780). One interest of these texts lies in the fact that this Digambara lineage of authors 
challenged Dharmakīrti’s conceptions (7th c.) and got engaged in a discussion with Buddhist 
authors when developing their own theories of inference and argumentation. More precisely, 
Jaina authors borrowed on such a large scale from Dharmakīrti that it was important to 
partake from the Buddhist tradition and develop a theory of knowledge easily recognizable as 
being specifically Jaina. Akalaṅka is the one to offer “a doctrine of source of knowing 
(pramāṇa)i typical of Jainas”.ii But the presentation of Akalaṅka is very concise and 
unsystematic. Therefore, it became the task of later thinkers, such as Vidyānanda (9th c.) and 
Māṇikyanandin, to present a more structured version of Akalaṅka’s innovative theory; as well 
as the task of even later thinkers such as Prabhācandra to present this in a developed way 
including precise references to the discussions with the Buddhists, especially quoting 
Dharmakīrti’s Essay on Knowledge (pramāṇavārttika, PV) and Auto-commentary on the 
Essay on Knowledge (pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, PVsV). 
There are many layers of discussion in the PKM. This paper is aiming at focusing on those 
taking place after the 8th century, where the input of Prabhācandra is fully appreciable. This is 
done from section 2. As for section 1, it is a necessary introduction on the Jaina general 
conception of inference, in which Jaina authors mainly refer to the Aphorisms on Logic 
(nyāyasūtra, NS) of Gautama, the Naiyāyika text of the 2nd century CE which is considered as 
the root text for logical considerations in classical India. Three remarks are in order. First, it is 
not possible to introduce Jaina theories of inference without introducing as well the Buddhist 
and Naiyāyika ones. Whereas this statement is true for all philosophical tradition, it is 
especially vivid in the Jaina one, where borrowings form the very core of their doctrines. 
Second, the lineage of Jaina authors dealt with in this paper also got engaged in later 
interesting discussions with the Naiyāyika tradition on the question of inference, but this is 
not included within the scope of this paper. Third, the input of Prabhācandra will be apparent 
mainly in section 2, 3 and 4.  
 
 
1. The Jaina conception of inference: some basics 
 
1.1. The canonical display form of an inferential reasoning  
First of all, the NS taught us that the only good way to express a truth-preserving argument 
consists of a group of five statements: 
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NS.1.1.32. [Statement of] the thesis, the evidence, the account, the application and the 
conclusion are the constituents [of inference].iiiiv 
 
This is in this form that Māṇikyanandin introduces the stated form of an inference, with the 
following examplev in PM.3.65: 
 
[Thesis] Sound is impermanent 
[Evidence] Because it is a product 
[Account] Whatever is such (a product) is alike (it is impermanent), such as a pot 
[Application] This (sound) is a product  
[Conclusion] Therefore it is impermanentvi 
 
This form of argument is an extended version of the modus ponens: 
 
P, P → Q 
Q 
 
And can be reconstructed as follow: 
 
[Thesis] a1 is Q 
[Evidence] Because a1 is P 
[Account] Whatever is P is also Q, like for a2 
[Application] Likewise, a1 is P 
[Conclusion] Therefore a1 is Q 
 
In this Naiyāyika presentation, it seems that both bottom-up and top-down approaches are 
used. More precisely, the bottom-up approach consists in the three first step, goes from 
conclusion to premises and insists on the justifications to be produced in order to be 
legitimize to claim a given thesis. As for the top-down approach, it consists in the three last 
steps, goes from premises to conclusion and insists on what can be concluded from given 
previous knowledge. According to the Nyāya, both these focuses bring different inputs and 
are required steps in order to be ensured of the adhesion of the interlocutor, since it has been 
said: 
 
NS.5.2.12. Defective is [the inference] in lack of any of its constituents.vii 
 
Here comes the first noticeable characteristic of the Jaina conception of inference: in the Jaina 
tradition from Siddhasena’s 7th c. Guide of logic (nyāyāvatāra, NA)viii, only the first two 
statements are considered as necessary steps in order to be ensured of the adhesion of the 
interlocutor. The three other steps are conceived as useful merely for pedagogical purposes. In 
Māṇikyanandi’s terms: 
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PM.3.46. These (account, application and conclusion) may be for the understanding of 
those who have little knowledge and for this purpose may be discussed only in the 
Śāstra, but these are quite unfit to be used in logical discussions.ix 
 
In other words, in a situation in which psychological factors are not relevant, because one can 
make the assumption that the interlocutor will always perform the best argumentative move 
from a given argumentative situation, then it is sufficient to state thesis and evidence in order 
to be ensured of the adhesion of the interlocutor. 
In this framework, stating the evidence pertains to stating that the already-known property, 
called ‘evidence-property’ (hetu) is ascribed to the very same object that the property to be 
inferred, called the ‘target-property’ (sadhya). In the above-mentioned example, stating the 
evidence pertains to stating ‘sound is a product’. The fact that there is a probative value of the 
statement of evidence is clear, since evidence is either the very justification of a claim, or the 
trigger that prompts a conclusion. To come back to the example, since everybody agree that 
whatever is a product is also impermanent, then agreement on the fact that sound is a product 
is the very trigger/justification of the agreement on the fact that sound is impermanent. But 
how is there a probative value of the statement of the thesis? 
 
 
1.2. Stating the thesis 
 
Jaina philosophers have to answer this question, since the Buddhist Dharmakīrti holds in his 
PV.4.15-27 that the thesis-statement, although it indicates the goal of evidence, is by no way a 
necessary part of inference as a source of knowing: 
 
PV.4.15. The statement of that [thesis] which is powerless is explained as having the 
goal of evidence (hetvartha) as its object. 
 
PVBh.488.5-6. But for us, the presentation of what is to be established is [regarded] as 
having as [its] object the goal of evidence and is not [regarded] as having a probative 
value.x 
 
First of all, stating the thesis is making explicit the goal of the inference at stake. Second, it is 
possible that Dharmakīrti is here referring to a Jaina theory according to which if one does not 
state the fact that the target-property is ascribed to the object under discussion, then evaluating 
an inference would be like seeing an archer touching a target without knowing if it was or not 
the intended target. The first mention of this argument is found in Siddhasena’s NA: 
 
NA. 14. […] the pronouncement of the thesis has to be made here as 
showing the domain of the evidence-property. 
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NA.15. Otherwise, for [a person] to be apprised, who is confused regarding 
the domain of the evidence intended by the proponent, the evidence might 
appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like… 
 
NA.16. …for a person watching an archer’s skill, the archer who hits 
without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both] skill and 
its opposite.xi 
 
Now, Dharmakīrti pursues by stating that this stating of the thesis is one condition of 
possibility of the mere performance of an inferential process, exactly in the same way than 
doubt and desire to overcome this doubt. For example, doubt is a condition of possibility of 
inference, since it is not plausible that someone who directly sees an elephant is in position to 
infer the existence of this elephant from the sound of its trump. Focusing on the Jaina account, 
it is noteworthy that a specific Jaina condition of possibility of inference, like of any indirect 
cognitive process, is for the epistemic agent to be in a special state of awareness called 
‘destruction-cum-subsistance’ (kṣayopaśama), which is a state in which karma obstructing the 
inherent capacities of the soul has been only partially removed. 
These psychological conditions are a fact. But if stating them was a formal requirement, then 
stating a truth-preserving argument would be an infinite process. Indeed, it is always possible 
to imagine new psychological conditions. These conditions have to be stated separately and 
not be considered as part of the argument. With this, Dharmakīrti reminds us that to be a 
condition of possibility of a probative tool does not equate to be a probative tool. What is 
more, the statement of the thesis cannot be of probative relevance, simply because, since it is 
precisely what is to be proved by means of inferential reasoning, if it had a probative strength, 
then the argument would be a circular one. On this precise line of argumentation, and 
contrarily to his usual practice,  Prabhācandra does not quote Dharmakīrti and only glosses 
Māṇikyanandi’s verse PM.3.35, according to which, in the lineage of Siddhasena, the 
statement of the thesis is indeed a required argumentative step, because it dispels doubts 
concerning the abode of the target-property, which is the goal of the inference at stake. 
 
Yet, Jaina philosophers do stand against Dharmakīrti’s position from another line of argument 
in PM.3.36, where it is stated that Buddhist philosophers cannot disagree on the necessity of 
the statement of the thesis, because otherwise they cannot substantiate their own doctrine. 
This Buddhist doctrine, as well as its Jaina criticism, will be considered at length in section 
2.2. For the time being, sufficient is to know that according to Buddhist philosophers, the fact 
that the evidence-property is ascribed to the case under consideration (pakṣa), that is to say 
the object to which are ascribed the inferential properties, is a necessary component in the 
evaluation process of the validity of evidence.xii On the contrary, Jaina philosophers will argue 
that the evaluation process of the validity of evidence is concerned with validity properly 
speaking only when no reference is made to the case under consideration (pakṣa), similar 
cases (sapakṣa) and dissimilar cases (vipakṣa).  
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To conclude on this topic, a brief survey of the evolution of the form of reasoning makes it 
evident that there has been a decision to bring it to its minimal form – that is to say to keep 
only the elements having a probative value, as well as a decision to discriminate and treat 
separately psychological conditions from more formal ones. In this process, Shah and 
Mookerjee remark that the Jaina approach is the one that goes the furthest.xiii More precisely, 
the old Nyāya advocated a ten-membered reasoning, in which explicit psychological 
conditions like doubt and desire to know were required. Then the NS brought it to five 
conditions linked only with structure of the argument. In this canonical form, redundancy has 
been pointed by different traditions. Especially, the Buddhists Dharmakīrti claimed that 
statement of the account accompanied either by statement of evidence, either by statement of 
application is sufficient. As for Jaina philosophers, they recognized only statement of the 
thesis and of evidence as necessary argumentative moves – although they also recognize that 
for pedagogical purposes, up to ten statements can be made. 
A noticeable aspect of the Jaina approach is their rejection of the statement of the account, 
that is to say of the statement that “whatever is P is also Q, like for a2”. This statement is a 
pivotal one, to say the less, since it contains the indication of the necessary relation that holds 
between the evidence-property and the target-property. But this statement is also a 
problematic one, since it contains the displaying of an example. In classical India, there were 
big controversies between those who considered the indication of an example as probative, 
and those who did not. The idea behind the requirement of an example can be tracked back to 
the need to show that there is at least one case other than the case under consideration in 
which the evidence-property occurs when the target-property also occur. This need can be 
explained in the following way: if the object under consideration is the only locus of the 
evidence-property, one can never be sure that there is an essential (and not only an accidental) 
relationship between the two properties. The classical example is that “sound is eternal, 
because it is audible”. In this example, since sound is the only audible thing, we cannot find 
any other example of another audible thing that would be eternal also. Therefore, the 
argument is not a convincing one, because nothing is known on the relationship between 
audibility and eternality. In other words, the same premises could as well lead to the claim of 
the opposite, namely that “sound is non-eternal, because it is audible”. What is more, it is also 
possible that the idea behind the requirement of an example can be tracked back to an old 
theory of drawing inferences from paradigmatic examples. For example, in order to know 
whether grains of rice are cooked or not, it is not required to taste each of them. Indeed, 
tasting a few of them is sufficient to infer from their state the state of the other ones, because 
they are all under the same conditions. Therefore, rejecting the step of the account, which 
includes the indication of an example, represents a step further towards only formal 
considerations. But this was only possible from the Jaina perspective, because only them 
could take the liberty of rejecting also the need to indicate the special relationship between the 
two inferential properties. Indeed, according to Jaina philosophers, this special relationship is 
known thanks to another, non-inferential, source of knowing. The causes, modalities and 
consequences of this position will be considered in the next section. 
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2. Jaina philosophers and the problem of induction 
2.1. Prabhācandra’s criticism of the Buddhist characterisation of evidence 
 
As already indicated, the fact that arguments in philosophical debates are displayed on an 
inter-doctrinal level calls for the need of a decision procedure such that every participant 
agree on the fact that a given inferential reasoning is (respectively is not) a truth-preserving 
argument. In this framework, this takes the following form: the assertion of a stated inference 
is traditionally followed by a regulated debate focusing on the characteristics of the evidence-
property, aiming either at proving that the piece of evidence is a probative one, either at 
refuting that it is. Therefore, logical treatises are concerned with the question of the necessary 
and sufficient set of criteria from which a debater is justified to claim that a given piece of 
evidence is probative, where the statement of evidence is probative if and only if the 
evidence-property is necessarily co-present (respectively co-absent) with the target-property. 
In other words, logical treatises tackle the following question: how can we know that the two 
inferential properties are necessarily, and not only accidentally, linked? How to be certain that 
‘being a product’ ensures ‘enduring changes’ not only in a subset of every possible situations? 
With respect to this problem, traditionally called the problem of induction, Jaina philosophers 
engaged into discussions both with Buddhist and Naiyāyikas philosophers. The PKM is a 
mine of such discussions. 
 
First of all, the question whether it is possible to know that all Ps are also Q from the 
knowledge that all a1, a2, …, an are Ps that are also Q is phrased the following way in the 
Indian tradition: Is there an invariable concomitance (vyāpti)xiv between the evidence-property 
P and the target-property Q? The Jaina answer to this question is that the only necessary and 
sufficient condition to be ensured of the presence of an invariable concomitance is precisely 
to know the ‘impossibility [for the evidence-property] to be otherwise’ (anyathānupapatti) 
than in the presence of the target-property. In Māṇikyanandin’s words: 
 
PM.3.15. Evidence is characterised by being inseparably connected with the target-
property.xv 
 
According to Balcerowicz, this new Jaina conception of what counts as good evidence is 
probably to be tracked back to a lost treatise, the Torment of the triple characteristic 
(trilakṣaṇakadarthana), an early 8th century work of Pātrasvāmin.xvi A look on Prabhācandra’s 
commentary to this verse also makes clear the fact that the Jaina theory of impossibility 
otherwise is introduced in reaction to the Buddhist theory of the triple characteristic of 
evidence, as well as to the Naiyāyika theory of its fivefold characteristic. 
 
As is well-known, the Buddhist theory of the triple characteristic of evidence developed by 
Dignāga (480-540) is an attempt to discriminate between accidental and necessary 
relationships, by stating that an evidence is a good one if and only if it is: 
 
8 
 
(i) Present in the case under consideration (pakṣa-dharmatva) 
(ii) Present at least in one similar case (sapakṣa-sattva) 
(iii) Absent in dissimilar cases (vipakṣa-asattva)xvii 
 
And Naiyāyika philosophers add the two clauses according to which it should also be: 
 
(v) Not contradicted by perception or another non-inferential source of knowing 
(abādhita-viṣayatva) 
 (iv) And not contradicted by another inferential evidence (asat-pratipakṣatva)xviii 
 
More precisely, the first clause prevents from cases in which the necessary relationship is not 
instantiated; the second clause is meant to avoid a situation in which one of the means 
enabling to check upon the relevance of the necessary relationship is absent; and the last three 
clauses prevent from cases of inconclusiveness, that is to say cases in which there is a 
counter-example.  
Facing this tradition, Prabhācandra, like many philosophers from different schools from the 
8th century onwards, argues that the three signs are neither sufficient, nor necessary in order to 
be assured of the correctness of the inferential evidence. When commenting upon 
Māṇikyanandin’s PM.3.15, Prabhācandra first shows that there are situations in which the 
three signs do not qualify the evidence-property, and yet it is a correct evidence-property. 
Here, Prabhācandra refers to the classic example of the audibility of sound. More precisely: 
 
PKM.355.2-3. […] Because for example audibility, which is present in no similar case, 
is admitted as a probative evidence in relation to the target-property ‘being 
impermanent’ in the case of the sound.xix 
 
Let us depart from the following reconstructed inference: 
 
[Thesis] Sound is impermanent 
[Evidence] Because sound is audible  
[Account] Whatever is audible is impermanent (no example available) 
 
In this argument, the evidence-property is considered correct by the Buddhists, even though 
the three marks of good inferential evidence are not present. What is missing is the second 
condition, that is to say that the evidence (being audible) is not in similar objects. This is due 
to the fact that no other thing than sound is audible. Consequently, no other thing than sound 
can be audible and also impermanent. This example is pointing at a problem affecting the 
second clause of the theory of the triple characteristic, which is the fact that this clause is 
meant to avoid a situation that is, to use Western contemporary terms, formally valid. More 
precisely, the only ways to defeat someone who claims “this is impermanent, because this is 
audible” is either to attack the premises by showing that this is not audible (first condition); 
either to attack the relationship between being audible and being impermanent, which can be 
done only by showing that there is at least one case in which it is true that something is 
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audible and not impermanent (third condition). But nothing on the relationship between the 
two properties can be concluded from a case in which it is not true that something is audible. 
In other words: it can perfectly be the case that there are no similar case and that there is a 
necessary relationship between the evidence-property and the target-property. Now, if 
Dignāga did not accept it as a situation ensuring the presence of a good evidence although it is 
a formally valid situation, it is probably because he had in mind persuasiveness and not 
formal validity and that in this situation, the evidence is not a persuasive one, because as we 
have already indicated, when the evidence is present only in the object under consideration, 
and in no other object, it is difficult to know whether the connection between the two 
properties is an accidental one or an essential one. What is more, this requirement is the sign 
that Dignāga could not yet free himself from the old model of inference from sampling, that is 
to say inference from a paradigmatic case. In conclusion, even if Indian philosophers made at 
that time regular breakthroughs towards formal considerations, they never explicitly 
formulated the requirement of formal validity and they were trying to define certainty by 
means of persuasiveness. 
 
Conversely, Prabhācandra also shows that there are situations in which the three signs indeed 
qualify the evidence-property, and yet the evidence-property is not probative: 
 
PKM.357.1-3. The three characteristics [described by Dignāga] should absolutely not 
define evidence, because they can be the case even when it is incorrect, as in “these 
fruits are ripe, because they bloom on one [and the same] branch, like this fruit [that is 
also ripe]”, as well as in “this Devadatta is stupid, because he is the son of this [man], 
like this other son of this [man] [who is also stupid]”.xx 
 
The last argumentxxi can be reconstructed as follow: 
 
[Thesis] Devadatta is stupid 
[Evidence] Because he is the son of this man 
[Account] Whoever is the son of this man is stupid, like this other son of the same man 
 
In this argument, the evidence-property is not probative, because lessen cognitive abilities can 
be due to other factors than genetic and educational ones linked to this precise man, as for 
example if oxygen was missing for too long a period in parts of the brain during childbirth. 
Such a cause of lessen cognitive abilities is accidentally and not essentially connected with 
the evidence-property, namely the fact of being a son of this man. Yet, the three marks of 
good inferential evidence are present: 
 
(i) Evidence-property (being the son of this man) is ascribed to the object (Devadatta) 
(ii) Evidence-property (being the son of this man) is ascribed to similar objects (another 
man has the same cognitive abilities and is also the son of this man) 
(iii) Evidence-property (being the son of this man) is not ascribed to dissimilar objects 
(no man of different cognitive abilities is the son of this man) 
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The traditional Buddhist reply to this attack consists in saying that in such an example, the 
third condition is not fulfilled, because it could perfectly be the case that someone with 
different cognitive abilities is the son of this man. What is new with Prabhācandra’s attack is 
that he then uses the Buddhist defence to claim that this later equals to defend that what 
ultimately counts is that the evidence-property cannot be thought of otherwise than in the 
presence of the target-property and that therefore, Buddhist philosophers agree with the Jaina 
theory of impossibility otherwise as being ultimately the only relevant criteria for the 
correctness of evidence. 
Noteworthy is the fact that Jaina philosophers go as far as to claim that sometimes, it is 
superfluous to state two members of inference, and that the statement of the impossibility to 
be otherwise only is sufficient for someone able to get all other required information from the 
context only.xxii 
 
Actually, what the Jains really criticize when attacking the theory of the triple characteristic is 
the fact that in the evaluation process of the validity of evidence, no reference should be made 
to the case under consideration (pakṣa), similar cases (sapakṣa) and dissimilar cases 
(vipakṣa). This has been put forwards by Akalaṅka, who shows, first that there are valid 
inferences without similar and dissimilar cases, especially inferences whose subject is “all”; 
second, that there are valid inferences even without an abode, as in the case of the movement 
of the planet.xxiii This has been developed by Prabhācandra in his Moon [that opens] the lotus 
of logic (nyāyakumudacandra, NKC), another commentary he wrote on Akalaṅka’s work.xxiv 
This shows an interesting focus from the Jaina side on the relationship between the inferential 
properties irrespectively of their context. In turn, this is explained by the fact that the context 
is being dealt with at other levels of analysis.  
 
 
2.2. A perceptual-like grasp of universals named ‘tarka’ 
 
A peculiar feature of the Jaina tradition is that the impossibility of the presence of the 
evidence-property otherwise than in the presence of the target-property, that is to say what is 
to be known in order to be assured that the two inferential properties are necessary co-present, 
is known by a separate cognitive process called ‘tarka’. Tarka is a perceptual-like grasping of 
universals, that I suggest to translate as ‘discernment of universals’.xxv In Māṇikyanandin’s 
world: 
 
PM.3.19. This (invariable concomitance) is ascertained by discernment of universals 
(tarka).xxvi 
  
Knowing invariable concomitance by means of another cognitive process consists in 
transferring the question of the establishment of the validity of the evidence-property from the 
realm of inference and inferential rules, to a second-order realm. In the PKM, Prabhācandra 
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explains the functioning of the ‘discernment of universal’ device at the occasion of the 
refutation of the Cārvāka view according to which inference is not a source of knowing 
(pramāṇa).xxvii More precisely, the reconstructed Cārvāka position is that inference cannot be 
considered as a source of knowing, because its validity is not established. And this in turn is 
due to the fact that inference relies on knowledge of invariable concomitance and that this 
later cannot be known. To refute this view, Prabhācandra explains that: 
 
PKM.178.16-18. It has been said that invariable concomitance (vyāpti) cannot be 
grasped by perception. This too is a mere (ineffective though true) statement. Invariable 
concomitance is based on a source of knowing called ūha (expression equivalent to 
‘tarka’) that rests on the strength on perception (apprehension) and non-apprehension. 
Neither the infinity of individuals nor deviation in place and so on suffice to obstruct the 
acceptance of that (invariable concomitance).xxviii 
 
First, it is clear that invariable concomitance cannot be known by perception, since perception 
deals only with particulars, and even the biggest list of particular instances would not suffice 
to reach certainty. What is more, we do perform inferences involving remote objects which 
cannot be perceived. Second, the following schemata makes it clear that invariable 
concomitance cannot be known by inference either, because it would lead to infinite regress: 
 
[…] 
C, C→(A→B) 
A, A→B 
B 
 
To explain, in order to infer B, it is necessary to know that both A and A→B are the case, 
where “A→B” represents the invariable concomitance between A and B. And if the fact that 
A→B is the case is known by means of another inference, then this second inference would 
also imply the knowledge of an invariable concomitance that would be known by means of 
another inference, and so on. In the Jaina tradition of Prabhācandra, this is not a problem, 
because the validity of inference can be established thanks to our ability to know invariable 
concomitance by the separate cognitive channel of discernment of universals. 
 
Second, this discernment of universals ‘rests in the strength on apprehension and non-
apprehension’. These apprehension and non-apprehension are not to be understood as the 
usual perception (respectively non-perception) of a particular. In order to understand the 
modalities of such a cognitive channel, let us go back to Prabhācandra’s text: 
 
PKM.178.19-20. Invariable concomitance is ascertained with the help of the universal; 
the existence of that (the universal) is based on its being the object of reliable awareness 
of uniformity that has not been shown to be false.xxix 
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PKM. 179.19. It is knowledge of the whole class that is labeled otherwise as ūha 
(tarka).xxx 
 
In other words, after stating that universals indeed exist, Prabhācandra explains that in a 
situation of co-presence of the two inferential properties, knowledge of invariable 
concomitance between them does not come from the apprehension of these two as particulars, 
nor from a mere repetition of these apprehensions, but it is the recognition of universal 
features in the two inferential properties. To quote Chakrabarty, this apprehension “is not 
merely observing things together […]. Apprehension is realizing that if something with 
certain properties exists, something else with certain properties must also exist”.xxxi This 
discernment of universals can be conceived as a sign of a Jaina perspective in the sense that 
the possibility of knowing universals in a particular situation can be linked with the fact that 
the Jaina epistemological theory of particular-in-universal facilitates the epistemic access to 
one from the other. More precisely, a complex object is conceived as having both an existent 
universal aspect and an existent particular aspect. Therefore, in the same situation in which 
one grasps fire and smoke, one can also grasp ‘fireness’ and ‘smokeness’. It is important to 
notice that Jaina and Buddhist conceptions of universals are different ones and that Jaina 
philosophers consider a universal as a distinct type of real entity, and not as the mere 
conceptual exclusion of dissimilarities. 
One gain of such a conception is that, since by means of discernment of universals, what is 
known is precisely the fact that smoke cannot be conceived without fire, no other knowledge 
is presupposed to establish a invariable concomitance, and no infinite regress is involved, like 
it was the case with the establishment of invariable concomitance by means of inference only. 
The possibility of this establishment without infinite regress thanks to discernment of 
universals is the pivotal point in a discussion with Dharmakīrti in his Essay on knowledge, 
PV.1.35 and 1.40, when he asks Jaina philosophers to explain the need of postulating an extra 
source of knowing when inference can serve well the same purpose.xxxii 
 
What is more, Prabhācandra insists on the fact that, like for any cognitive process, the 
discernment of universals presupposes that the epistemic agent should at least be in the 
destruction-cum-subsistance’ (kṣayopaśama) state of awarenessxxxiii, in which karma, the 
particles obstructing the inherent capacities of the soul have been partially removed. Yet, it 
seems that this special cognitive process requires more than the usual partial karma removing 
and that its very possibility is linked to the fact that Jain metaphysics allows for the soul to 
possess extra-mundane faculties by means of removing karma. And indeed, as pointed by 
Shah, the Jainas authors themselves were conscious of the difficulty to explain how 
discernment of universals can give us certitude, since in his Investigation on knowledge 
(pramāṇamīmāṃsā, PMī), Hemacandra (1088-1173) writes that: 
 
PMī.36. At the time of knowing the invariable concomitance between two properties a 
man attains the status of a mystic.xxxiv 
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This observation links the Jaina discernment of universals (tarka) with the Naiyāyika 
extraordinary perception called ‘sāmānya-lakṣaṇa’xxxv, as well as with the Yogic perception 
propounded by the Buddhist Prajñākaragupta.xxxvi This leads us to the problem of the means to 
establish the validity of the discernment of universals. The beginning of an answer to this 
question has already been indicated when we presented the discussion with the Buddhist, 
Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsaka, and is fully given by Prabhācandra when he states that: 
 
PKM.352.19-22. If the agreement (reliability) of discernment of universals (tarka) is in 
doubt, how can there be inference that is free from doubt? In the absence of that how 
can it be proven that perception as a whole is reliable and separate it from what is not 
reliable? Therefore, one who wants inference to be doubt-free should admit a doubt-free 
source of knowing for the relation between the probans and the probandum.xxxvii 
 
To conclude, the Jaina theory of discernment of universals that enables to know the one mark 
of evidence is a challenging one. One of its main consequences is the fact that it transfers the 
problem of induction to a second-order level. In turn, a consequence of this move is the fact 
that inferential rules are not falsifiable anymore.xxxviii But this also means that what ultimately 
grounds inference is a personal experience not subject to decision procedures in rational 
investigation and discussion. 
 
 
3. Types of inferential evidence: the Jaina contributionxxxix 
 
3.1. The ontic foundations for valid reasoning 
 
Although they do offer this external means to ground inference, Jaina philosophers also 
follow and propose amendments to Dharmakīrti’s attempt to tackle the question of the criteria 
of a good inference from an internal perspective. More precisely, we have seen that what 
Dignāga theory lacked in order to be able to evaluate the correctness of a invariable 
concomitance was a proper theory of relevant relationships between two properties. In order 
to achieve one, the Buddhist Dharmakīrti drops the second condition of the theory of the triple 
characteristic of evidence and accepts as good evidence only the ones that are “naturally” 
connected. In Katsura’s words, Dharmakīrti thus provides “the ontic foundation for valid 
reasoning”.xl In his theory, natural connections that enable inference are of two kinds: 
essential and causal. 
To begin with, the first type of natural relation is the essential (sva-bhāva) relationship 
between a natural (pervaded) property and  its pervasive property, the traditional example 
both in Buddhism and in Jainism being the relationship between “being a Sissoo-tree” and 
“being a tree”. This type of invariable concomitance defines a type of inferences related to 
class identity, which ensure absolute certainty since they are cases of analytic inclusion of a 
class within another. Dharmakīrti’s theory points the fact that it is not accidental that 
whenever there is a Sissoo tree, there is also a tree, this is due to the very nature of the tree. 
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Therefore, from the presence of a Sissoo, I am legitimize to infer the presence of a tree. 
Contrarily to this, if this object is a tree, I do not know if it is a Sissoo or another type of tree. 
Therefore this relation is not symmetric. 
As for the second natural relation, it is the causal (kārya-kāraṇa, or tad-utpatti) relationship 
between an effect and its cause, for example between fire and smoke. From the presence of 
smoke on a remote hill full of tigers, I am legitimize to infer the presence of fire on it, even 
though I do not see this fire. This is also non-accidental, since it is due to the very nature of 
smoke, which is an effect of the fire. This cause-effect relationship is the canonical model for 
the presentation of an inference schemata. The popularity of this type of inference based on 
causality is due to the fact that it turns an inference into a scientific explanation, that is to say 
an investigation into the causes of a given phenomenon. For Dharmakīrti, this relation is not 
symmetric either, due to the fact that causal process might involve different temporal points, 
therefore speech on future events, like in the case of the emergence of a sprout from a seed. 
Indeed, if a soil is possessing a seed, I cannot be sure that it will be possessing a sprout, 
because we can never be sure that the two following pre-requisites are being fulfilled: (i) no 
impediment is blocking the potency of the given cause to produce its effect; (ii) all the 
conditions required for the production of the effect at stake are present. 
 
Facing this theory, Jaina philosophers argue that much more kinds of evidence are to be 
granted. The first Jaina critic of Dharmakīrti was Akalaṅka, who got engaged with Buddhists 
in a discussion on the status of cause, predecessor and successor as correct evidence. In the 
tradition of Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandin especially gives a comprehensive list of the types of 
inferential evidence granted in Jainism, when he writes in his Introduction to philosophical 
investigation that there are especially six situations in which the presence of an invariable 
concomitance is unquestionable, namely when the evidence-property is (i) a property 
pervaded (vyāpya) by the target-property; (ii) an effect (kārya) of it; (iii) a cause (kāraṇa) of 
it; (iv) a predecessor (pūrvacara) of it; (v) a successor (uttaracara) of it; or (vi) a co-existent 
(sahacara) of it. We are going to follow Māṇikyanandi’s exposition. 
 
The first divergence with Dharmakīrti is that the later considers that only the effect, and not 
the cause, can serve as evidence in a valid inference. As we have seen, the reason of this is 
that there might be impediments blocking this potency of the cause. Contrarily to this, Jaina 
philosophers recognise cause as correct inferential evidence, as in the following example: 
 
PM.3.67. I know that there is shadow here, because there is an umbrella here.xli 
 
In order to be legitimate to do so, Māṇikyanandin  offers a more finely grained definition of a 
‘cause’ as being what already consists of the totality of conditions for the emergence of the 
effect. In other words, as what already ensures the fact that the pre-requisite that nothing is 
blocking its potency is fulfilled. As for Dharmakīrti, a closer look on his texts, especially 
PVsV 1.7.1, reveals that, given appropriate restrictions, he also considers it possible to draw 
an inference in which a cause is used as good evidence, provided the fact that the conclusion 
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of the inference has the status of a potentiality, not that of an actuality. And that denying the 
status of inferential evidence to cause mainly pertained to refusing to talk about future events. 
  
The second disagreement concerns worldly regularities. In this line, Jaina philosophers argue 
that two phenomena do not need to be essentially or causally related in order to be necessarily 
co-present. First, this can be the case between two co-present properties, for example between 
the taste and the colour of a fruit. Indeed, it is sufficient to know the colour of a fruit to infer 
its taste.xlii Second, this can be the case between two properties whose presence is separated by 
a time-interval, for example the order of apparition of the stars in the sky. Indeed, it is 
sufficient to know that the Pleiades are rising in order to know that Aldebaran will rise 
soon.xliii And this is due to a worldly regularity by means of which the rising of the stars is 
something predictable.xliv 
In the first case, Buddhists disagree and argue that the taste and the colour of the mango are 
simply two properties that are both effects of the same stage of ripeness of the fruit. 
Therefore, this situation can be tracked back to causality and essence only. 
The second case seems more robust to criticism, since neither essence, nor causality, seem fit 
to explain properties whose existence is separated by a time (discontinuous) interval, therefore 
Buddhist philosophers should not be able to rephrase this situation in terms of their 
acknowledge relationships and have to accept an extra category or to deny that the Pleiades-
inference is a correct one. But here again, the Buddhists conception of causality is strong 
enough to enable them to argue that both rises of stars are co-effects of the same causal 
conditions, namely a given state of the sky. 
 
It seems that this last divergence is the sign that Buddhist philosophers ground inference upon 
a necessary relation, whereas a universal relation is sufficient for the Naiyāyika and the Jaina 
conceptions. More precisely, predictions are possible and practical certainty is effective as a 
guideline for everyday life behavior, but this does not equal scientific certainty, which is more 
demanding. In this example, it is possible that the star Aldebaran disappears. As a 
consequence, the inference “Aldebaran will rise soon, because the Pleiades has just risen” 
would not be true anymore. On the contrary, no tree might exist anymore, it will not change 
the fact that if there is a Sissoo here, it is entirely impossible that there is no tree here. This 
inference remains true whatever the situation might be. In this discussion, it seems that only 
the link between a natural property and its object is a necessary one. This might explain the 
fact that Dharmakīrti rephrases the causal relation in terms of the essential relation, saying 
that the set of conditions enabling the presence of an effect is included in, is essentially 
connected to, the set of conditions enabling the presence of its cause. To come back to the 
main argument, it seems that Naiyāyika and Jaina philosophers are on the contrary not 
seeking necessity. I would like to suggest that whereas this is the case with Naiyāyika 
philosophers, Jaina thinkers do seek necessity, even if they do so on a different level, and that 
the reason of their acceptance of the regularity of worldly phenomena as sufficient grounds 
for inference is due to the fact that the regularity of worldly phenomena granted by Jaina 
philosophers is strong enough to ensure necessity even in these cases. More precisely, in the 
Jaina cosmogony, it is considered that after the universe is destroyed, it manifests itself again, 
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endures, is again destroyed, and so on in an infinite circle of manifestations. In this way, even 
if the Pleiades die, their nature is such that at the next manifestation of the universe, they will 
again be followed by Aldebaran. Hence, the presence of an invariable concomitance means 
that in every context, there is another accessible context in which the relationship between the 
two inferential properties holds. This is in this precise sense that the search for necessity does 
not invalidate inferences based upon worldly phenomena thanks to the regularity granted in 
Jain cosmology. 
 
 
3.2. Non-apprehension and negative inferential statements 
 
From a logical point of view, the next interesting step of these treatises is an introduction of 
negation, which renders more complex the conception of the characteristics of the relation 
that holds between inferential properties. We have already indicated that essential relations 
are asymmetric. This asymmetry is due to the fact that the two inferential properties do not 
have the same scope and that one is included in the other. For example, we can infer the 
presence of a tree from the presence of Sissoo, but not the reverse. In the case of causal 
relations, asymmetry is linked with the problem of the possibility to perform a speech on 
future events. For example, Dharmakīrti points out that we can infer the past presence of a 
seed from the actual presence of a sprout, but not the reverse. And Jaina philosophers insist on 
the fact that given appropriate restrictions, the reverse is possible, because we can infer the 
future presence of a sprout from the actual presence of all the conditions (and conditions of 
conditions) of its emergence, included the presence of a seed. Here, Jains have an external 
comprehensive – ‘God-eye’ – view, therefore non temporal, on the causal chain.  
 
The introduction of negations affects this framework and comes from the observation that 
humans do not only want to infer presences and do not only infer from presences. Knowledge 
of absences also can have a place in the inferential process, may it be in the premises or in the 
conclusion. Therefore, the next step in a theory of inference is to study the impacts of 
knowledge of absences on the above mentioned discussion. One of these being the 
introduction of shifts. For example, psychological considerations aside, the situation 
described at the beginning of this paragraph is reversed. More precisely, it is possible to infer 
the absence of a Sissoo from the absence of a tree, but not the absence of a tree from the 
absence of a Sissoo. And it is possible to infer the absence of a sprout from the absence of a 
seed, but not the absence of a seed from the absence of a sprout (unless appropriate 
restrictions are introduced). Jaina philosophers might have been the first ones to tackle this 
issue and to offer a classification of types of evidence taking into account these shifts. 
Interestingly, they developed this through a side-way, since the departure point of these 
considerations is a criticism of Dharmakīrti’s conception of non-apprehension as a type of 
inferential evidence. 
More precisely, Dharmakīrti introduced a third type of inferential evidence, named ‘non-
apprehension’ (anupalabdhi). This type of evidence accounts for the fact that it is not 
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accidental that whenever there is no tree, there is also no Sissoo. Now, this type of evidence is 
not linked with a natural connection, contrarily to a natural property or an effect, which 
function as good evidence because they are linked to essential and causal connections. Yet, 
this type of evidence does ensure necessity, because it can be considered as a sub-type of the 
first two types of evidence, since it is a mere modification from them. When introducing non-
apprehension as a type of evidence, Dharmakīrti’s program is quite specific: he intends to 
prove the possibility of knowing absences from inference. This, in turns, enables him not to 
commit himself to the existence of a third kind of means of knowledge besides perception and 
inference. The main difference between Dharmakīrti’s account and the Jaina one is that ‘non-
apprehension’ is not listed by Jaina philosophers as good evidence, but as part of the general 
form the linguistic display of an inference might have. Indeed, Jaina philosophers inherit from 
Dharmakīrti’s theory but not from its original problem, as Jains do not mind to posit extra 
sources of knowing. From this, they can restructure the theory and shape it in order to solve 
other problems. In such a way that by the time of Māṇikyanandin, non-apprehension is 
primarily conceived as a negative premise in the stated form of an inference. In other words, 
the Jaina focus is on non-apprehension as a negation, that is to say as a linguistic device 
usable to reverse the truth value of a sentence. This work on the relationship between negative 
(respectively affirmative) premises and negative (respectively affirmative) conclusions led 
them to single out four forms an inference might have, namely: 
 
(i) Affirmation of the thesis when compatible evidence is known (aviruddha-upalabdhir 
vidhau); 
(ii) Negation of the thesis when incompatible evidence is known (viruddha-upalabdhiḥ 
pratiṣedhe); 
(iii) Negation of the thesis when compatible evidence is not known (aviruddha-
anupalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe);  
(iv) Affirmation of the thesis when incompatible evidence is not known (viruddha-
anupalabdhir vidhau). 
 
And in each form, this is not the same set of types of evidence that is considered as prompting 
valid inferences. This is not the place to have a close look into this theory,xlv for the present 
purpose of a general survey of Jaina theories of inference, sufficient is to know that their 
focus is more and more on the linguistic form. For example, this led them to state a rule for 
imbricated cognitions, which equates to say that the invariable concomitance relation is 
transitive, when they say in PM.3.90 that “the pieces of evidence which arise one after the 
other should be included here (in this list)”.xlvi 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this theory of ontic foundations was introduced to give a method to be assured 
of the validity of an inference, and this within the inferential process. Although Jaina 
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philosophers do not need it, because they already grant the discernment of universal (tarka) as 
being a separate source of knowing enabling to establish the validity of an inference, they do 
consider it. This can first be explained by the fact that developing on this theory is a good 
occasion to understand better the precise functioning of the inferential process. Second, this 
can be explained by the fact that in the framework of philosophical disputations, it is 
important that the different traditions share a common set of tools. 
What is more, after the adoption of the theory of ontic foundations by the different traditions, 
the core of logical analyses in the classical Indian hall of philosophical debates pertains to the 
following questions: what are the exact properties between which the invariable concomitance 
holds? And how are they naturally connected, that is to say which type of invariable 
concomitance does hold? Once these questions are answered, the deduction can go on. 
Obviously, the problem of an agreement on the decision procedures is still an open one, since 
philosophers still disagree on what can be called an ‘effect’, etc. of something. This is in this 
line that one of the greatest contribution of Jaina philosophers is made. More precisely, Jains 
argue that at this step, we can at least agree to disagree, and they offer a theory making 
explicit and legitimizing the divergences between the claims of the different traditions, by 
offering a theory of parameterization of assertions, both at the epistemic and ontological level. 
This is especially developed in the theory of angles of analysis (nikṣepavāda) and in the 
theory of viewpoints (nayavāda). This paper is not the place to describe these approaches to 
context. What is interesting to notice is that the same Jaina traits are present both in these and 
in their theory of inference, first a Jaina insistence on linguistic considerations; second, a 
belief in the underlying rationality of the world; and third, a belief in the possibility of an all-
comprehensive perspective, which is connected to a will to exhaustivity in their 
classifications. 
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Notes 
                                                          
i This translation of ‘pramāṇa’ is found in Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, Classical Indian 
Philosophy of Induction. The Nyāya viewpoint (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 2ff. 
ii Krishna Kumar Dixit, Jaina Ontology (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 31, Ahmedabad: 
L.D.Institute of Indology, 1971), p. 143. 
iii NS.1.1.32: Pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigamanāny avayavāḥ. Edited on the 
Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages. See also Gaṅgānāṭha Jhā, The 
Nyāyasūtra of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara I 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 355. 
iv Unless stated otherwise, all translations are from the author. 
v This example is the same as the one put forwards by the Naiyāyika tradition, see for example 
the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana (450-500) in Jhā, Nyāyasūtra I, p. 360. 
vi PM.3.65: pariṇāmī śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt. ya evaṃ sa evaṃ dṛṣṭo yathā ghaṭaḥ. kṛtakaś ca 
ayaṃ tasmāt pariṇāmī iti. Edited in S. C. Ghoshal, The Parīkṣāmukham of Māṇikyanandin 
(Lucknow: The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1940), p. 127. 
vii NS.5.2.12: hīnam anyatamena apy avayavena nyūnam. In Jhā, Nyāyasūtra IV, p. 1757. 
viii See NA.14-20. Piotr Balcerowicz, Jaina epistemology in historical and comparative 
perspective I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008), pp. 59-64. 
ix PM.3.46: bāla-vyutpatty-arthaṃ tat-traya-upagame śāstra eva asau na vāde, anupayogāt. 
Edited in Ghoshal, Parīkṣāmukham, p. 111. 
x PV.4.15: hetv-artha-viṣayatvena tad-aśakta-uktir īritā. PVBh.488.5-6: asmākaṃ tu yo 
’numeya-nirdeśaḥ sa hetv-artha-viṣayatvena na sādhanatvena. Translation from Tom J.F. 
Tillemans, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Wien: Verlag des 
Österreichischen Akademie des Wissenschaften, 2000), p. 30. 
xi NA.14-16: tat-prayogo’tra kartavayo hetor gocara-dīpakaḥ. anyathā vādy-abhipreta-hetu-
gocara-mohinaḥ, pratyāyyasya bhavedd hetur viruddha-ārekito yathā. dhānuṣka-guṇa-
saṃprekṣi-janasya parividhyataḥ, dhānuṣkasya vinā lakṣya-nirdeśena guṇa-itarau. 
Translation from Balcerowicz, Jaina epistemology I, pp. 59-60. 
xii It is hard to understand why, in the Jaina criticism, a failure to recognize that the target-
property is ascribed to the case under consideration is an impediment to know that the 
evidence-property is ascribed to it. A hypothesis is that in an inferential process, scopes have 
to be exact. In this example, we are not merely talking about sound, but about sound as 
characterized by being permanent, precisely because what matters to ensure necessity is not 
being sound, but being permanent. 
xiii
 Nagin J. Shah, Akalaṅka’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti Philosophy (Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute 
of Indology, 1967), p. 282; and Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist philosophy of universal flux 
(University of Calcutta, 1935), p. 364. 
xiv This Sanskrit expression means “pervasion”. But since it does not concern only cases of 
pervasion, it has been translated as a technical logical term by Indianists as “invariable 
concomitance” in order to refer to the more general situation in which whenever one member 
of this relations is present, the other member is present too. 
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